Getting Real About Privacy:
Eccentric Expectations in the Post-9/11 World
by Jeff Breinholt1
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Imagine an America completely free of violent crime. What if, through the combination
of modern technology and political will, we could be 100 percent safe from physical assaults on
our streets ? What is this could goal could be achieved without jeopardizing civil liberty or
personal privacy? Impossible?
Consider this scenario:
In the future, science establishes that every person on earth has a particular gait they
display every time they show themselves in public. Let=s say that scientists design a way to
assign a unique identifier that corresponds this gait. This identifier will be a set of alpha-numeric
digits, unique to each individual, which correspond how we move while walking. It is not based
on any private information; the act of putting one foot in front of the other to propel your body
down a public street has never been considered a private act or something reasonable people
consciously try to conceal.
Let's assume that this identifier can be assigned on the basis of a video capturing a person
walking 10 paces, and that it is robust enough the discern intentional attempts to disguise one's
walking style. The Agait identifier@ is assigned whenever someone applies for a driver's license or
enters the United States through an immigration checkpoint. It is done on the basis of a 10second video capture that is taken at the same time driver's license or US entry. The national
"gait identity registry" is kept in a single secure government database, unavailable to the public.
Persons incapable of walking, since they do not comprise an urban violent crime threat, are
exempted from the registry.
Meanwhile, satellite reconnaissance technology develops to the point where digital video
can be taken of an entire U.S. urban area. This technology is efficient enough to operate
effectively irrespective of weather, and sufficiently precise to capture enough of a moving image
to allow modern computers to be able to compare it to the government-maintained gait index
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registry. A digital video can be taken continuously, 24 hours a day, and stored for a period of
several months before being discarded.
A legal regime in established through which law enforcement officials can petition a U.S.
district court to order another part of the government to process and release a videoclip of certain
duration directed at particular geographic coordinates. Armed with the video, law enforcement
can push a button and compare it to nationwide gait index registry, and establish who was present
at a certain time and certain place in the five boroughs of New York City.
One night, a school teacher in the Bronx is killed in an apparent robbery as she walks
away from an ATM machine. Pursuant to the established legal regime, local homicide detectives
obtain judicial approval to obtain the satellite footage for a four-minute period where the body is
found, at the approximate time of death. The cops now have a digital recording of the murder,
although it is not of sufficient quality for them to analyze it themselves.
Armed with this footage, the cops cause it to be run against the gait index registry. This
process quickly gives them a hit. The computer finds a match and generates the name and a local
thug whose unique style of movement matches the video of the assailant. They locate and arrest
him. At his trial, the prosecutor calls a witness to authenticate the video footage and the
particular method that resulted in the match on the gait index registry. She then puts on an expert
who describes this process, and renders an opinion that the person who killed the school teacher
has a gait that matches that of the defendant to a mathematical certainty. The jury convicts the
defendant of murder.
What happens now? The technology that facilitated this conviction is not a sensitive
intelligence method. After all, it was deliberately disclosed and described to the public in the
murder trial. In fact, by this time, it is already well-known to the American people, whose
elected officials have enacted the legal regime that made it possible. This legislative process was
the subject of extensive media coverage and public dialogue, and open discussion between the
civil libertarians and the pro-security partisans. It was carefully considered by the U.S. Congress
and the President who signed the bill creating the regime.
This public debate had some additional benefits. The application of this technology to
the problem of violent street crime puts would-be violent criminals on notice that their conduct,
committed outdoors, is perpetually being captured on video and capable of being reviewed if they
decide to commit violence crime somewhere on the city streets. The footage, captured 24-hours
a day, is only processed upon a court order supported by probable cause, and is accessible by law
enforcement who demonstrate to a neutral judicial officer that a violent crime has been
committed at a particular time and place.
Word spreads. The bad guys are deterred. Rational actors, they soon work the risk of
being caught into their calculation whether to engage in street crime. Their decisions are affected
by their interminable fear that what they do, in the great outdoors, in a setting as easily witnessed
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by innocent bystanders as by the government's eye in the sky. Outside violent crime becomes a
thing of the past. Empirically, people are now more safe outdoors than within their homes. The
economy booms. The United States has become the sole democracy to eliminate violent crime.
What about the cost? The U.S. does not even need to establish satellite coverage of every
American city. It merely needs to rotate the satellites in an unannounced way, to keep the violent
criminals guessing and uncomfortable. Are Americans outraged by this? If so, they are going to
have to weigh their disapproval against the obvious benefits B the certainty that they can walk
with their families, in any city, any time, day or night, irrespective of their gender or socioeconomic status, and be completely secure in their persons and property - something never
thought possible. Urban violent crime is eliminated. Police presence is decreased. Many of the
cops on the street are transferred to desk jobs where they become experts in this new technology.
It has taken a concerted, zero-tolerance, enforcement initiative to convince the bad guys that it's
not worth the risk. Over time, an entire generation of Americans grows up without any personal
sense of danger from strangers on the street, other than what they watch in movies and television
reruns set in the past.
What about the potential for abuse? The government puts its full weight behind the
security of these tools, aggressively punishing those who try to hack into the system, as well as
law enforcement personnel who do not follow the rules and leak information collected under this
initiative. There is no private access of either the satellite product or the gait index registry.
While the fact of the technology and its capabilities is well-known, the product of it can be
accessed neither by private persons nor rogue law enforcement for their own personal agendas.
Violations may occasionally occur, but the culprits of treated sufficiently tough for it not to be a
common occurrence.
Is this scenario technologically feasible? For purposes of this article, I am not concerned
with that question, since the foregoing is merely as a tool through which to consider the
controversy over the trade-offs between freedom and security in 21st Century America. Since
9/11, bookstores have been filled with polemic arguments and academic studies, offering
prescriptions on how to assure the safety of Americans while maintaining our way of life. Many
of these books argue that we are on the wrong path, destined to regret the hysterical reaction now
on display towards Islamic fundamentalism. They seem to take on faith the notion that we are
going way too far in the application of technology to day-to-day police problems. Many of them
break down on the weight of their own arguments, and do not adequately address the type of
legal regime I describe above.
Jeffrey Rosen and The Naked Crowd
One of the more recent books is The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in
an Anxious Age (Random House, 2004), by George Washington University Law Professor
Jeffrey Rosen.1 Professor Rosen is very uncomfortable with the post-9/11 threat that modern
technology poses to personal privacy and individual freedom. Unlike other commentators,
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however, Rosen=s fear is not necessarily a government run amok, although there is some of that.
Crediting the possibility that Congress and the judiciary may be able to effectively control crimefighting technology so it does not infringe of liberty, Rosen=s concern is mainly with the public
itself who -- unlike him -- appears incapable of seeing the dangers and insisting on technological
architecture that is both effective and privacy-protecting. Because of this ambivalence, he
argues, we are doomed not recognize necessary controls and to accept draconian government
surveillance while losing our most cherished freedoms.
Rosen=s view of the average citizen in a democratic society drives his argument. The title
of the book derives from a certain security technology he describes in the prologue. After 9/11,
security officials tested a machine that Rosen calls the Naked Machine. By bouncing
microwaves off the human body, the machine produces a three-dimensional naked image of the
subject. Not only does it expose guns and weapons concealed in the subjects= clothing, but also
their unique anatomical characteristics.
The utility of the Naked Machine to counterterrorism is obvious. It seems that the Naked
Machine can be refined further, to produce images that extract the concealed objects and projects
them onto a sexless mannequin B an invention Rosen calls the Blob Machine. Americans care
deeply about personal privacy and human dignity and, given the choice, obviously prefer the
Blob Machine to the Naked Machine, right? To Rosen=s chagrin, studies how this is not always
the case. It seems that many people actually express of preference for the Naked Machine. He
explains:
When asked why, the people who choose the Naked Machine over the Blob
Machine give a range of responses. Some say they are already searches so
thoroughly at airports that they have abandoned all hope of privacy and don=t mind
the additional intrusion of being naked. Others say they=re not embarrassed to be
naked in front of strangers, adding that those who have nothing to hide should
have nothing to fear. (A few are unapologetic exhibitionists.) Still others are
concerned that the Blob Machine would be less accurate in identifying weapons
than the Naked Machine, and they would prefer not to take chances. And in each
group there are some people who say they are so afraid of terrorism on airplanes
that they would do anything possible to make themselves feel better, even if they
understand, on some level, that their reaction is based on emotions rather than
evidence. They describe a willingness to be electronically stripped by the Naked
Machine as a ritualistic demonstration of their own purity and trustworthiness in
much the same way that the religiously devout describe rituals of faith. They
don=t care, in other words, whether or not the Naked Machine makes them safer
than the Blob Machine because they are more concerned about feeling safe than
being safe.2
Rosen bemoans this fact. Anxiety over personal safety means that people are willing to
show themselves naked B to join the Naked Crowd B rather than hold to their principles and insist
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on technological restrictions to assure their continuing privacy. Rosen=s book is devoted to tries
to convince us of the dangers. He hates that citizens are so willing to embarrass themselves over
the Internet,3 and he attributes this to increased anxiety over identity, which he claims drives
people to be more concerned with maintaining their feeling of connectedness than the Asocial
costs of exposure.@4
What would Rosen say about the Agait index registry@ scenario I posit above? Based on
his words in the Naked Crowd, he would be likely to find something wrong with it, overstating
the dangers while minimizing the significance of a crime-free society. In the book, while he
acknowledges possibility of designing technology and laws that protect both liberty and security,
he argues that this process needs to be value driven, lest we accept the juggernaut of technologies
that are both ineffective and threaten our privacy.5 To illustrate his point, he describes the United
Kingdom=s fixation with surveillance cameras as a cure for their crime problem, technology he
claims, through empirical studies, has failed to make British society any safer.6 It is here that
Rosen gives himself away. Discussing the U.K. experience with video cameras as crime-fighting
tools, Rosen notes that the cameras are designed not to produce arrests but to make people feel
they are constantly being watched.7 They are Aintended to scare local hoodlums into thinking
they might be setting off alarms even when the cameras are turned off.@8 This, to Rosen, is a
terrible thing. He argues that the cameras are in tension with the value of society, since they
Apromote social conformity.@9 and that it would be a mistake for the U.S. to follow the lead of our
English colleagues.10 He does not answer the obvious question: what=s wrong with promoting
conformity with laws designed to prevent people from physically abusing others?
The reason for this may be the author=s cavalier attitude towards crime and a dismissive
attitude towards those who feel Americans have a right to be secure in their persons and property,
or believe that a society like ours need not tolerate lawlessness which can be eliminated or
minimized without infringing on reasonable expectations of privacy. Rosen is afraid of the
government=s use of technology becoming too efficient, of an America becoming too safe. He
openly worries that modern technology raises the prospect that persons misidentified as serious
criminals being punished for Atrivial crimes that are far easier to detect,@ while ignoring the fact
that even small crimes are criminal offenses.11 He hypothesizes that citizens will feel a sense of
indignation at living in a zero-tolerance society in which they are prosecuted for minor
infractions of the law.12 If crime is the price we pay for living in a free society, Rosen seems to
say, the elimination of crime cannot occur without the elimination of privacy. It is as if security
and privacy are on opposite sides of an algebraic equation. If crime could be eliminated through
technology, the people who would feel the real indignation are those who cannot be weaned of
their notion that all crime-fighting involves invasions of reasonable expectations of privacy. If
the Asilver bullet@ crime-fighting technology does not offend most people, Rosen believes that it
should. Why? Because, like many commentators, Rosen embraces eccentric notions of privacy.
Rosen=s previous writing demonstrates his sympathies. Written after 9/11, The Naked
Crowd and acknowledges (while complaining about) the need to consider technological advances
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to increase security. Rosen=s views have not changed much since the release of his previous
book on the subject, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America (Vintage
2000), released prior to 9/11.13 The chosen title of this earlier book is a tip-off about Rosen=s
tolerance for eccentricity.
The concept of the Aunwanted gaze@ comes from what Rosen describes as a Aremarkable@
development in Jewish law, known as the Hezzek Re=iyyah. This doctrine would expand the right
of privacy to protect people not only from physical intrusions into their homes but also from
surveillance Aby a neighbor outside the home, peering though a window in the common
courtyard.@14 He writes:
Jewish law protects neighbors not only from unwanted observation, but also from
the possibility of being observed. Thus, if your neighbor constructs a window that
overlooks your home or courtyard, you are entitled to an injunction that not only
prohibits your neighbor from observing you but also orders the window to be
removed. From its earliest days, Jewish law recognized that it was the uncertainty
about whether or not we are being observed that forces us to lead more constricted
lives and inhibits us from speaking or acting freely in public spaces.
Professor Rosen will need to excuse those who differ with him on whether the concept of
an Aunwanted gaze@ should guide post-9/11 U.S. domestic security policy. As we know, many
ancient cultures felt threatened by the intrusion of such modern inventions as photography,
believing that the act of taking their picture represented a theft of their souls. Few argue that
such believes are something modern society should institutionalized. The very concept of the
"unwanted gaze" seems to credit the notion that people can subjectively determine how much
privacy that can enjoy as they go about their lives, no matter how strange or incompatible with a
modern society. Does Rosen recognize this? He apparently did not before 9/11, for The
Unwanted Gaze shows a high degree of tolerance for ethnic communities whose world view is
driven by anachronistic beliefs:
In traditional Muslim societies, any social recognition between the sexes can be
interpreted as a prelude to sexual intercourse. Islamic cannon law requires women
to cover all but their heads and face. Muslim women are expected to look
demurely at the ground at the approach of a man, while men are enjoined from
gazing directly at women, especially unveiled women. These different examples
suggest that although social norms of accessibility vary widely according to
culture and context, people have a general expectation that they won=t be molested
by social overtures to which they haven=t explicitly or implicitly given consent.15
As he does later in The Naked Crowd, Rosen in The Unwanted Gaze expresses chagrin
that more American do not care about privacy.16 In the latter, he uses as an example Jennifer
Ringley, Aa twenty-one year old exhibitionist in Washington D.C. who has a Web-cam trained on
her bedroom twenty four hours a day.@17 He seems to be asking, Where is our sense of decency?
-6-

Getting Real About Privacy
J. Breinholt – September 2005

If Ms. Ringley does not feel embarrassed, maybe she should. Civil libertarians, however, should
be among her strongest supporters in arguing that this choice is her=s. Rosen seems to be arguing
that there should be a uniform standard for personal privacy. The problem: who decides?
Perhaps those who take offense at the concept that people are free to look at them, and that the
Aunwanted gaze@ should be legally actionable.
Rosen does not directly argue for eccentric notions of privacy are currently accepted by
U.S. courts. A good lawyer, he recognizes the law is against him, for in America neither the
Constitution nor the various federal statutes designed to protect against the dissemination of
private information recognize an inalienable right to be free of all subjectively Aunwanted@
attention. At some point, the legitimate interest of the state predominates, and courts label
eccentric notions for what they are.
This point was illustrated during this most recent Supreme Court term, the appeal from a
Nevada state court conviction of someone who refused to identify himself to a local sheriff.18
Reporting to the scene of a commotion by the side of the road, the sheriff explained to a drunken
man standing beside a truck that he was investigating a report of a fight, and asked for
identification. The man refused, became agitated, insisted he had done nothing wrong, and began
to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and
take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: the officer asked for identification
eleven times and was refused each time. After several warning, the sheriff placed him under
arrest. The arrested man turned out to be Larry Dudley Hiibel, who was charged and convicted of
the state crime of obstructing a public officer attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office,
by refusing to provide his name. A majority of the Supreme Court upheld Hiibel=s conviction. It
appears that there is no inalienable constitutional right to refuse to provide your name to law
enforcement, no matter how Aunwanted@ their attention is.
In American jurisprudence, a person=s expectation of privacy need not be obviously
eccentric to be rejected by American courts as unreasonable. Consider the case of Wabun-Inini,
also known as Vernon Bellacourt.19 In March 1989, he left two rolls of color film for processing
at an F-Stop One Hour Photo Store in Minneapolis An FBI agent entered the store, displayed
his credentials, and asked a store clerk whether he could purchase a set of prints from the film
Wabun-Inini had left to be developed. The employee obliged. Upon Wabun-Inini's return to the
F-Stop, store employees informed him that they had provided the FBI with prints of his film.
Two months later, Wabun-Inini filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Government's
seizure of the prints was unlawful and requesting injunctive relief. The district court dismissed
his case, and Wabu-Inini appealed the dismissal.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing the seminal Supreme Court case of Katz v.
United States,20 noted that there is a two-part test for determining whether a governmental search
or seizure is unconstitutional: whether (1) the person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, (2) the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as Areasonable.@
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Finding that Wabun-Inini had established a subjective expectation of privacy in his film,
the Eighth Circuit turned to the second prong. It described a principle that has remained steadfast
over time: what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. To the court, Wabun-Inini's subjective expectation
of privacy was not one that society is prepared to recognize as Areasonable,@ in light of the record
revealing that his photographs were exposed to public view during the development process. It
noted that trash, which is enclosed in opaque plastic bags and left on the curb in front of their
home for collection, can be searched without a warrant. While the residents of the house may
minimize the likelihood that the bags contents would be inspected by anyone, this belief is
objectively unreasonable because they had exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to
defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection.
By analogy, Wabun-Inini's use of the F-Stop for photo processing exposed his
photographs to the public sufficiently to defeat his claim to Fourth Amendment protection:
We simply hold that Wabun-Inini's decision to leave his film with the photo
processor in this instance, which used processing techniques involving exposure
of the photographs to public view for a limited time, make his expectation of
privacy objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold that the FBI action here
did not violate Wabun-Inini's rights under the Fourth Amendment.21
In American law, the idea that people's weird desires should be subsidized ultimately
fails, for one=s refusal to be examined when one goes out in public is not legally cognizable. To
be sure, courts recognize the constitutional right to privacy, but this is defined by objectively
reasonable beliefs. In America, one cannot refuse to have one's picture taken, at least if one
wants such modern conveniences as the right to operate a motor vehicle. That view of personal
privacy would not be objectively reasonable.
In The Unwanted Gaze, Rosen is very direct about his disagreement with these types of
results and with the Katz doctrine. While the case applauded as a victory for privacy, AAit soon
became clear that it was entirely circular.@ He argues:
People=s subjective expectation or privacy tend to reflect the amount of privacy
they subjectively experience, and as advances in the technology of monitoring and
searching have made even more intrusive surveillance possible, expectations of
privacy have naturally diminished, with the corresponding reduction in
constitutional protection.22
So what is the problem? Society moves on. We have gone beyond the belief that
photographs of our faces are thefts of our soul. Our expectations have evolved, with the help of
technology. Is this bad? It seems that technology has also increased our life expectancy. In
thinking about personal security, we should not be bound by Luddite beliefs. Over time, history
exposes them for what they are: eccentric cranks.
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Although unknown to Professor Rosen when he wrote The Unwanted Gaze, attempts to
credit eccentric views of privacy is being played out right now in townhalls across America. It
involves a truly benign provision of the USA PATRIOT Act that the ACLU has used to launch a
major industry-wide hysteria. The particular industry that claims to be aggrieved by Section 215
- the organized librarians (a class of people, perhaps more than other special interest groups,
have less of an excuse to be misinformed about laws.) They would have the public believe that
the PATRIOT Act, which nowhere mentions the word "library" or "librarians," represent a major
threat to library patrons. It appears that the FBI, armed with sufficient predication, can actually
examine out library circulation records.
Is this a new consequence of the USA PATRIOT Act? Hardly. Law enforcement always
had the right to inquire into the retail records, as Rosen knows. Take the unfortunate example of
Monica Lewinsky, who Rosen in The Unwanted Gaze portrays as a victim. Ms. Lewinsky felt
aggrieved by the Independent Counsel Ken Starr=s issuance of a subpoena for her bookstore
purchases. As Rosen describes it:
Lewinsky herself was especially unsettled by Starr=s decision to subpoena a
Washington bookstore for receipts of all her book purchases as one of the most
invasive moments in the Starr investigation, along with the moment the
prosecutors retrieved from her home computers the love letter she had drafter, but
never sent, to the President. AIt was such a violation,@ she complained to her
biographer, Andrew Morton. AIt seemed that everyone in America had rights
except for Monica Lewinsky. I felt like I wasn=t a citizen of this country
anymore.@23
Using the Monica Lewinsky as a example of invasion of privacy suffers from two
problems. First, the Starr prosecutors were able to obtain a copy of her bookstore purchases
years well before 9/11 and the USA PATRIOT. Clearly, Section 215 does not raise a new threat;
law enforcement, armed with a legitimate need for evidence that may reflect reading habits and
retail decisions, has always been able to obtain such records. Second, the sympathy one might be
inclined to feel for Ms. Lewinsky expression of outrage should be tempered by the realization
that such outrage is being expressed in the context of her autobiography, a project designed to
expose her life to as many people as possible around the world. If she was unfairly brought into
the public eye by the Starr investigation, she certainly did not mind being there in the end. Like
Jennifer Ringley, maybe Monica Lewinsky should be embarrassed. The fact that she was not
disputes, rather than supports, Rosen=s views of privacy, and of a population that does not view
privacy as he thinks they should. Both of Rosen=s book are filled with expressions of this
frustration.
On the Internet, every Web site we visit, every store we browse in, every
magazine we skim, and the amount of time we spend skimming it, create
electronic footprints that increasingly can be traced back to us, revealing detailed
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patters about our tastes, preferences and intimate thoughts.24
As in the Naked Crowd, he acknowledges in The Unwanted Gaze that AUnless we pull
down the curtains and never leave the house, none of us can avoid being observed, and therefore
judged, fairly or unfairly, by others.@25 In terms of what Americans should do to protect itself
from the Aunwelcome@ glare of others, is that not a little over the top?
David Cole and Enemy Aliens
While Rosen expresses these views, across town another academic is making similar
arguments. When not teaching at Georgetown Law Center, Professor David Cole represents
accused supporters of Palestinian terrorists. His latest book, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards
and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (The New Press, 2003) mainly focuses on
Cole=s often-repeated mantra: that there should be no legal distinction between Americans and
non-Americans, apparently even when conferring such things as the benefit of American
citizenship. Cole believes that the actions the U.S. takes against non-citizens here are a prelude
to what we will eventually to our own nationals should not exist, since what we do to our illegal
residents is bound to be turned on us. In his words, AWhat we are willing to allow our
government to do to immigrants today creates a template for how it will treat citizens
tomorrow.@26 Like Rosen, Cole knows that the law is not on his side.27 Also like Rosen, he is
chagrined that Americans are not more outraged about what is being done in the name of national
security. He is shocked, for example, by a National Public Radio poll taken a year after 9/11
found only 7 percent of American felt they had personally sacrificed any important rights or
liberties in the war on terrorism.28
Civil libertarians frequently claim that the events of 9/11 did weird things to people. To
them, the government's reaction - the round-up of several hundreds of illegal aliens from Middle
East countries, rushing the USA PATRIOT Act through Congress -- surely represented mass
hysteria. What about what 9/11 did to them?
For those familiar with Professor Cole=s career, the big surprise on Enemy Aliens crops up
about a quarter of the way through the book, when the liberal scholar exposes himself to be as a
law-and-order type. It seems that Cole, after the shock of 9/11, may be in the pro-security camp
after all. He writes:
The PATRIOT Act made many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and
intelligence law. Some of these changes sensibly updated criminal law to reflect
changing technologies. For example, the advent of cell phones justified the
PATRIOT Act=s authorization of so-called Aroving wiretaps,@ which permit the
wiretapping of any phones that a target may reasonably use, rather than only
specified phone numbers, and the nationwide warrants, which permit taps to
follow an individual even if he travels outside the jurisdiction of a particular
federal district. Other provisions removed barriers to the sharing of information
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between foreign intelligence and law enforcement officials in international
terrorism investigations, on the reasonable ground that international terrorism is
simultaneously a matter of foreign intelligence and criminal law enforcement.
We certainly want law enforcement authorities with knowledge of Al Qaeda=s
activities abroad talking to those with those with knowledge of Al Qaeda=s
stateside activities. The PATRIOT Act=s extensive money laundering provisions
seek to respond to new methods of money laundering , and while the financial
community has questioned whether these changes will have any effect on
terrorism, these provisions do not raise civil liberties objections.29
When it comes to the use of modern technology to gain an insight into the activities of
those who would cause us harm, it seems that David Cole B unlike Jeffrey Rosen B is not a
Luddite: he is not alarmed by this new technology or the prospect that it could be effectively
harnessed by a legal regime to protect against unfair invasions of privacy.
That hope is quickly destroyed. A few pages later, Cole is back to his old self, criticizing
some of those provisions he had just heralded as Asensible.@
[The PATRIOT Act] authorizes secret wiretaps in criminal investigations without
probable cause to believe that the target is engaged in criminal conduct or that
evidence of a crime will be found... It accomplishes this by amending the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA authorizes wiretaps and searches,
based not on the usual showing of probable criminal conduct or evidence, but on
the much easier showing that the target of the intrusion is an Aagent of a foreign
power,@ defined very broadly to include any officer or employee of a foreignbased political organization....The extraordinary authority provided by FISA was
initially justified on the ground that foreign intelligence gathering is different from
criminal law enforcement, and that the intelligence power would not be used for
purposes of investigating crime....[The PATRIOT Act changes to FISA] in effect
denies the Fourth Amendment=s most basic protection to any person who might
qualify as a foreign agent B predominantly but not exclusively foreign nationals.
What happened to Cole=s endorsement of the PATRIOT Act=s information-sharing rules,
premised on the recognition that Ainternational terrorism is simultaneously a matter of foreign
intelligence and criminal law enforcement?@ What about his acceptance of the need for
intelligence agents and law enforcement officers to share information about Al Qaeda? His
earlier favorable assessments it seems, were premised on the assumption that intelligencecollection methods such as FISA should taken away from the government. Why is FISA
unconstitutional? According to Cole, it is because the legality of particular FISA surveillance is
never subject to adversarial testing in the courts. This conclusion would be somewhat surprising
to those courts that have issued judicial opinions on the constitutionality of specific FISA
investigations.30
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Unlike Rosen, Cole does not spend much space arguing that the American public is too
dense to see the risks to their privacy. He is more concerned with government run amok. Here,
Cole seems to agree with Rosen that a certain amount of lawlessness is a good thing, since
stamping it out would mean the government is too efficient. He notes, for example, AWhile no
one condones threats of violence, surely every non-citizen who gets into a bar fight with a
weapon does not warrant unilateral detention, particularly as our law does not authorize such
detention even for the most hardened, recidivist criminal citizen.@31 To David Cole, a
government armed with the technological tools that permits it to eliminate violent crime within
the confines of the constitutional jurisprudence should not deploy them because a little crime and
violence are somehow an important part of the American experience. If the law permits the
development of such technology and the American public reach a consensus that they want it, it
is because the courts and the people, unlike Cole and Rosen, do not see things their way. Both
authors= criticism is directed at the government. The private sector is spared their wrath. Neither
is particularly bothered by the kind of surveillance undertaken by commercial enterprises. Their
real beef is with the government, and law enforcement in particular.32
What is particularly amazing about Cole=s position is it voiced while he acknowledges
that some of the post-9/11 law enforcement powers have made us us safer. He is nonetheless
against them, so ingrained is his anti-government animus:
Some of the measures I have criticized may well make us safer. Laws aimed at
denying financial support to organizations that engage in terrorism, for example,
are likely to hinder those organizations=s ability to do evil, even as they hinder
many people=s ability to do good. ...And relaxing the threshold requirements for
searches and surveillance may lead to the discovery of evidence that would have
otherwise eluded detection., in other words, that some of the measure adopted
since September 11 may well have made us safer ... My point is that when the
government relies so heavily on double standards to strike the balance between
liberty and security, its loss of legitimacy among persons, communities and
nations potentially our partners in the struggle against terrorist has it own
substantial security costs.33
In other words, it is better if we risk the lives and safety of Americans on own homeland
than offend those who are visitors here (and who, incidentally, are barred from voting, in a
perfectly constitutional form of discrimination based on nationality), who would view the U.S.
government as less Alegitimate.@
Back to the Future?
Perhaps we should come back to reality, by considering how Rosen and Cole would view
my perhaps-unrealistic satellite-assisted gait index registry of the future. As noted, the power of
my hypothetical scenario is not in its realism or feasibility, but rather in what it says about our
legal and political culture. If such technology was developed, could it be implemented?
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One of the beauties of my scenario is that it avoid the complaints about racial profiling.
The gait index is race-blind, as is the technology that compares it against the satellite
surveillance. As such, nobody can claim that certain ethnic groups are being unfairly targeted for
prosecution. This would seem to solve many of Professor Cole=s complaints, although the
technology may well result in a disparate impact on defendants of certain ethnicity and national
origin. The disparate impact of accurate technology is not objectionable, at least not as a
constitutional matter.
What about personal privacy, the focus of Professor Rosen=s works? If courts were more
inclined to agree with him, people could assert that they have a constitutional right not to have
their gait being recorded and stored, or their movements in public being recorded by our satellites
in the sky. This argument would be unavailing in light of the Katz doctrine. Like having your
driver license photograph taken, a videotaped capture, in modern society, does not amount to a
theft of your soul. Faced with this reality, Rosen would likely be relegated to arguing that the
technology could not be perfected. This is, after all, how he handled a British technology that
comes close to being the Asilver bullet@ of crime fighting.
In 1996, the City of London adopted a predecessor to the current automated
license-plate-recognition system that records the plates of all cars entering and
leaving the city. The stored license plat numbers are compared with a database of
those stolen cars, and the system can set off an alarm whenever a suspicious car
enters the city.34
What, exactly, is so wrong with this? Rosen does not say, other then noting current
science on human face recognition is not as reliable. That hardly means that such technology
should not be pursued. For him, the future is grim, since Americans are no longer alarmed by
technology. As he notes in The Unwanted Gaze, A[Nothing in this book offers any reason to
except that the public will demand laws and technologies that will protect liberty and security at
the same time ... Refusing to evaluate whether or not these new laws and technologies in fact
increase security, the public may willingly acquiesce in the destruction of privacy without getting
anything tangible in return.@35
Why is this the case? According to Rosen, it is because our civic debate is too polarized. On the
one side is what he calls the technopositivists: those who greet every proposed expansion of
government surveillance power with unthinking enthusiasm. On the other side are the
Aprincipled Luddites,@ who are fighting the Quixotic battle against the proliferation of
technologies that will ultimately ruin our humanity.36 This polarity minimizes the prospect that a
true balance can be struck. If true, it is not hard discern where Jeffrey Rosen falls on the
continuum.
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